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SOVEREIGNTY AND THE SACRED: THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE IN INDIAN COUNTRY
Rodney K. Smith"
I. INTRODUCTION
Shortly after arriving in Montana, to serve as Dean of the
School of Law, I had the opportunity to visit six of the seven
tribal colleges in the state. As I visited each of those colleges, I
was struck by the pervasive role of religion in sustaining the
culture that makes those colleges special, places with the capaci-
ty to significantly increase access to higher education for the
Native American population. On my tour of the various colleges,
blessings were given, prayers were spoken and sung, and a sense
of reverence seemed to prevail at each institution. Realizing that
those colleges receive substantial federal funding,' I reflected on
the issue of whether the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment should extend to Indian Country. I knew that my
friends, who are committed to the concept of the separation of
church and state, particularly in instances involving the receipt
of government funds, would be troubled by the pervasiveness of
religion at the tribal colleges and throughout the public sector in
Indian Country. No distinct lines between the sacred and the
secular were being drawn at the colleges that I visited, and Es-
tablishment Clause principles in action were conspicuous by
their absence.
In this essay, I examine the role, if any, of the Establish-
ment Clause in Indian Country. In analyzing this issue, I first
briefly summarize the historical role of the Establishment and
Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment in Indian Coun-
try. In that section, I note that the Free Exercise Clause has
been applied in Indian Country, but that the Establishment
Clause has not. In the next section, I examine various justifica-
tions that have typically been given for refusing to invoke the
Establishment Clause in dealing with issues of religious freedom
in Indian Country. I then conclude that those justifications may
t Copyright © 1995, Montana Law Review; Rodney K. Smith.
* Dean and Professor of Law, The University of Montana School of Law.
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1. The amount of this federal aid will grow substantial with the signing into
law of the recent bill making 29 tribal colleges land-grant institutions. See Scott
Jaschik, President Clinton Signs Law Making 29 Tribal Colleges Land-Grant Institu-
tions, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., November 9, 1994, at A32, col. 1.
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carry political weight, but they are not theoretically or philosoph-
ically sufficient. I then turn to other support for the exclusion of
Establishment Clause doctrine in legal analyses related to reli-
gion in Indian Country.
II. FREE EXERCISE AND ESTABLISHMENT IN INDIAN COUNTRY:
A BRIEF HISTORY
On May 18, 1896, the United States Supreme Court decided
Talton v. Mayes,2 involving an appeal by Talton of a death sen-
tence that he had received at the hands of a tribal court. In re-
jecting Talton's appeal, which questioned the jurisdiction of the
tribal court, the Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment
to the Federal Constitution did not "apply to the local legislation
of the Cherokee [NIation so as to require all prosecutions for
offenses committed against the laws of that [Niation to be initi-
ated by a grand jury organized in accordance with that amend-
ment." The Court noted that, "the powers of local self govern-
ment enjoyed by the Cherokee [Niation existed prior to the Con-
stitution, they are not operated upon by the Fifth Amendment,
which... had for its sole object to control the powers conferred
by the Constitution on the National Government."3 Only Justice
John Marshall Harlan, Sr., dissented,4 and did so without writ-
ten opinion.
The Talton principle that the Bill of Rights does not apply in
matters of tribal governance in Indian Country, has been adopt-
ed in a variety of contexts, including cases dealing with the reli-
gion clauses of the First Amendment.5 For many years, neither
2. 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
3. Id. at 382, 383.
4. It is ironic that Justice Harlan was the lone dissenter in Talton and in
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), in which the Supreme Court first articu-
lated the separate but equal doctrine in the racial context. That irony is compounded
by the fact that Talton was argued on April 16th and 17th, and decided (announced)
on May 18, 1896, while Plessy was argued on April 13th, and also decided (an-
nounced) on May 18, 1896. While the timing of both argument and decision in these
two landmark cases may be mere coincidence, as may be the fact that Justice
Harlan alone dissented, it is intriguing to note that the decisions have some common
substantive theme, although with different ramifications. In Plessy, the Court is ac-
knowledging that separate but equal racial accommodations satisfy the demands of
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and, in Talton, the Court
refuses to extend constitutional protections to tribal legislative actions. In both in-
stances, the Court is willing to defer substantially in constitutional rights cases, in
one instance to the states and in the other to the tribes.
5. See Peyote Way Church of God v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir.
1991); Native American Church of North America v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d
131 (10th Cir. 1959).
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the Free Exercise nor the Establishment Clause limited tribal
legislative action in Indian Country. The Civil Rights Act of
1968, however, included a rider that changed the Talton princi-
ple that the Bill of Rights was inapplicable to actions of tribal
government. In particular, the rider, sometimes referred to as
the Ervin Bill (named after its principal author Senator Sam
Ervin), states that: "No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-
government shall-(1) make or enforce any law prohibiting the
free exercise of religion, or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and to
petition for a redress of grievances .... " With this act, free
exercise was to be protected in Indian Country, despite decisions
to the contrary rendered in Talton and its progeny.7 Protection
against establishment of religion by tribal governments was not
included. It is understood, therefore, that except to the extent
that either a tribe agrees to be bound by the Establishment
Clause or an advocate can transmogrify an establishment argu-
ment into a free exercise argument, the Establishment Clause
does not apply in Indian Country.
There is another sense in which it might be argued that
Establishment Clause limitations should apply in Indian Coun-
try. It could be argued that when a tribe receives federal eco-
nomic support, it becomes a state actor. As a state actor, the
tribe, in turn, subjects itself to the Fourteenth Amendment and
to the Bill of Rights, which have been incorporated and made
applicable to state actors. For example, when the tribal colleges
receive federal and state tax dollars to assist them in their edu-
cational endeavors, they become agents of the state-state ac-
tors. Thus, by receiving that federal and state support, the tribes
subject themselves to the limitations, including the Establish-
ment Clause, contained in the Bill of Rights, and incorporated
and made applicable to state actors through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Support for religious activities on the tribal college
campuses would, therefore, be governed by the Establishment
Clause. It might be countered, however, that funds were received
6. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(1) (1988).
7. This congressional action was consistent with language in the Talton case to
the effect that, "True it is that in many adjudications of this court the fact has been
fully recognized, that although possessed of these attributes of local self-government,
when exercising their tribal functions, all such rights are subject to the supreme
legislative authority of the United States." 163 U.S. at 384. Thus, whatever sover-
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in accordance with the trust doctrine' and should not convert
the tribes into state actors. The arguments that follow provide
political and philosophical support for such a conclusion.
III. WHY THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE SHOULD NOT BE IMPOSED
IN INDIAN COUNTRY
A number of arguments can be marshalled to support the
proposition that Establishment Clause doctrine should not limit
tribal activity. Before turning to those arguments, however, it
will be helpful to describe briefly the basic uses to which Estab-
lishment Clause doctrine has traditionally been put. As to gov-
ernment aid, it mandates that aid must be given in a neutral
manner, that does not evidence a preference for one form of
conscience over another.9 Thus, for example, in the tribal college
context, if the Establishment Clause applied, Native American
and related religious activity could only be permitted if other
forms of conscience (religious and otherwise) were treated in a
similar manner. In other words, non-Indian religious activity
would have to be given equal treatment, together with Indian
religious activity.
In a related sense, the Establishment Clause has been in-
voked to limit instances in which particular religious practices or
rituals are given the stamp of approval of a state or government
actor. In the tribal college context, therefore, the tribe would be
precluded from endorsing (permitting) particular religious and
cultural activities of a. religious nature. Thus, blessings, singing
and other activities that uniquely reflect Indian culture and
religion would be precluded, unless other non-Indian activities
were also included on an equal basis.
Finally, when state actors exempt religious activity from the
limitations imposed by laws of general applicability, it may be
argued that the state is establishing a religion. Because many of
these accommodations or exemptions come under the aegis of the
8. The federal and state governments have a special trust relationship with
the tribes, both as a matter of history and of sovereignty. That trust relationship,
therefore, might be used to insulate the tribes from legal actions based on the Estab-
lishment Clause, on the ground that funds received were payments pursuant to the
trust relationship and should not convert that relationship into one that makes the
tribes agents of the state. Sharon O'Brien, 36-49 (Jan. 12, 1995) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with the Montana Law Review).
9. See Rodney K. Smith, Conscience, Coercion and the Establishment of Reli-
gion: The Beginning of an End to the Wandering of a Wayward Judiciary?, 43 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 917 (1993) (examining relevant cases and a doctrinal exegesis).
[Vol. 56
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Free Exercise Clause, a potential conflict develops between the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses (i.e., free exercise
mandates the very exemptions or accommodations of reli-
gion-preferential treatment-that are limited by establishment
doctrine). This conflict has been avoided in the tribal context to
date, however, because only the Free Exercise Clause has been
applied as to matters of tribal governance.
It is clear, therefore, that if the Establishment Clause doc-
trine was to apply in the tribal context, it could have a dramatic
impact. Tribal religions and cultural activities are often inextri-
cable and frequently are at the center of public activities and
ceremonies. To exclude tribal religion from the public sector
would make the tribal government secular in ways that contra-
dict the tribal culture. A number of arguments justify the cur-
rent refusal to extend the Establishment Clause to the tribal
context.
The first argument is largely political and is based on the
constitutional protection traditionally afforded to tribal sover-
eignty. Tribal sovereignty was formally recognized in Worchester
v. The State of Georgia,10 in which the Court, in an opinion
written by Chief Justice Marshall, held that the sovereignty of
tribes is limited only by the overriding legislative authority of
the United States. Marshall set the stage for the Court's decision
when he opined:
America, separated from Europe by a wide ocean, was
inhabited by a distinct people, divided into separate
nations, independent of each other and of the rest of
the world, having institutions of their own, and governing
themselves by their own laws. It is difficult to com-
prehend the proposition, that the inhabitants of either
quarter of the globe could have rightful original claims
of dominion over the inhabitants of the other, or over
the lands they occupied; or that the discovery of either
by the other should give the discoverer rights in the
country discovered, which annulled the pre-existing
rights of its ancient possessors."
The Chief Justice then added, "From the commencement of our
government, congress has passed acts to regulate trade and
intercourse with Indians; which treat them as nations, respect
their rights, and manifest a firm purpose to afford protection
10. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
11. Id. at 542-43.
299
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which treaties stipulate."" Thus, while Congress had power to
regulate trade and commercial activity under the Constitution, it
did so only in a manner that otherwise recognized tribal sover-
eignty as a given.
In the context of the Worchester case, Chief Justice Marshall
concluded:
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community occupying
its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in
which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the
citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent
of the Cherokees themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and
with the acts of [Clongress. The whole intercourse between the
United States and this nation, is, by our constitution and laws,
vested in the government of the United States. 3
Thus, since the founding of our nation, Indian tribes have been
subject in some respects to the power of Congress to regulate
commerce, but have been otherwise treated as quasi-sovereign
nations.
Given this sovereignty, it can be forcibly argued that, as a
political matter, the tribes should be permitted to resist applica-
tion of the Establishment Clause, unless embodied in some act of
Congress or in some law promulgated by the tribes themselves.
This argument is essentially political. It legitimizes, in a political
sense, the power of the tribes to resist imposition of the Estab-
lishment Clause in the tribal context. Without more, however,
the sovereignty argument is tautological and does not offer justi-
fication for such a power of exclusion (sovereignty).
Other philosophical arguments have been formulated to
justify the power to resist imposition of Establishment Clause
doctrine in the tribal setting. The major argument proffered is
based on the need to sustain Indian culture. In People v.
Woody,"' a case upholding the right of an Indian tribe to permit
use of peyote for religious purposes, the California Supreme
Court, Justice Tobriner writing for the majority articulated a
cultural justification for its decision:
12. Id. at 556-57. Marshall added that congressional acts evidence that Con-
gress "manifestly consider[s] the several Indian nations as distinct political communi-
ties, having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive, and
having a right to all the lands within those boundaries, which is not only acknowl-
edged, but guaranteed [sic] by the United States." Id. at 557.
13. Id. at 561.
14. 394 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1964).
300 [Vol. 56
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In a mass society, which presses at every point toward confor-
mity, the protection of self-expression, however unique, of the
individuals and group becomes ever more important. The vary-
ing currents of the subcultures that flow into the mainstream of
our national life give it depth and beauty. We preserve a great-
er value than an ancient tradition when we protect the rights
of Indians .... 15
In these sentences, Justice Tobriner seems to make two related
points: (1) given the pressure of the dominant national culture, it
is imperative that subcultures be protected; and (2) those subcul-
tures need to be protected, not just because they are of ancient
origin, but because they enhance both the capacity of individuals
to express themselves-they increase the expressive choices
available to individuals-and the depth and beauty of our na-
tional life.
Both of Justice Tobriner's arguments help justify the right of
tribes to resist imposition of Establishment Clause doctrine
when it threatens the tribal subculture. First, since the tribal
subculture is but a very small part of a far more dominant na-
tional culture, it deserves protection, even when that protection
permits it a modicum of dominance in its own right. In other
words, given the immense pull of the dominant national culture,
which is largely European and anglo in its makeup, on all Amer-
icans, including Indians, special protection for Indian culture is
warranted. To add the force or violence of law, 6 in the form of
the Establishment Clause doctrine, to the enormous force exert-
ed by the majority culture would further weaken the role of the
tribal subculture in influencing individual, tribal, and national
identity.
This need to preserve various expressive choices-cultural,
religious and other factors that influence or provide a menu from
which individual and community-based choices can be made-is
really a part of Justice Tobriner's second argument for preserv-
ing tribal culture. When there is but one choice, there is little
freedom. Thus, Tobriner would preserve various subcultures
despite arguments that they should be subsumed in the national
15. Id. at 821-22.
16. Professor Gedicks describes the violence that can be done in the lawmaking
process, in the religion/cultural area. See, Frederick M. Gedicks, RFRA and The Pos-
sibility of Justice, 56 MoNT. L. REV. 95, 105-13 (1995). This violence, coupled with
the power of the dominant culture, clearly can inhibit, and perhaps even incapaci-
tate, the role of tribal subcultures in contributing to individual and tribal identity.
7
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legal and broader culture. He does so on the ground that in-
creasing cultural choices in fact increases freedom and expres-
sive choices available to individuals. The existence of groups of
fellow participants or believers, including membership in tribal
subcultures, helps maximize one's expressive capacity in a collec-
tive manner. For example, when students gather together in a
tribal college that reflects tribal culture/religion, their expressive
capacity is maximized in much the same way that the whole is
always greater than the sum of its parts. 7
Justice Tobriner's final point-that maintenance of vibrant
subcultures enhances the beauty and depth of our national
life-may merely beg the question. The mere existence of variety
may contribute to beauty, but it does not necessarily do so. It can
also contribute to a dissonance that is anything but beautiful.
One must explain why multiple cultures contribute to beauty
and depth in our national life. To better understand the way in
which the protection of subcultures may enhance the beauty and
depth of our national life, it will be helpful to draw upon a dis-
tinction between deliberative and dedicated cultures, that has
been elucidated by Professor Lipkin.1"
In his article, Professor Lipkin distinguishes between delib-
erative and dedicated cultures in an elaborate manner. He sum-
marizes the distinction as follows: "Deliberative cultures resolve
the problems of cultural conflict and change by appealing to the
values of rationality and autonomy, while dedicated cultures
resolve these problems by appealing to the values of constancy
and closure." 9 Lipkin acknowledges, however, that, in drawing
17. See, e.g., Howard M. Friedman, Rethinking Free Exercise: Rediscovering Re-
ligious Community and Ritual, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1800-1801 (1994), for a relat-
ed argument. Professor Friedman suggests that "it makes sense to see the Free Ex-
ercise Clause as primarily concerned with the ability of religious groups to command
the loyalty of their adherents through a system of beliefs and practices . . . .This is
not to denigrate concerns over protection of individual conscience. Most religious
claims of conscience are connected to the belief systems of organized religious
groups." Id. at 1801. Cultures, including religious ones, provide us with expressive
choices. When we express such choices as part of a group we expand our capacity for
influence and action.
18. See generally Robert J. Lipkin, Multicultural Constitutionalism: Liberalism
and the Distinction between Deliberative and Dedicated Cultures, (Jan. 1, 1995) (un-
published manuscript, on file with the Montana Law Review).
19. Id. at 3. He adds, later in his article:
The deliberative attitude incorporates deliberative rationality and
deliberative autonomy. Deliberative rationality is a critical process of giving
reasons for and against substantive positions about the ends and means of
cultural inquiry. It also includes questions of identity, scope and order of
reasons. Fallibilism and revision concerning both means and ends are defin-
302 [Vol. 56
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this distinction, he does not mean to "suggest that any mature
culture can be exclusively constituted by one or the other." °
Rather, he distinguishes between cultures that are "predomi-
nantly" deliberative or dedicated." After arguing that the domi-
nant culture in our country is liberalism, a deliberative culture,
Lipkin asserts that deliberative cultures including our dominant
culture "cannot explain and justify tolerating dedicated cultures
in the sense of appreciating or respecting their values."22 The
dominant liberal or deliberative culture is unable to justify dedi-
cated cultures, as things of beauty or depth because they are
based on a different paradigm. This inability may explain why
Justice Tobriner was unable to do more than simply state that
respect for subcultures will lead to enhanced depth and beauty
in the national arena.'
ing features of deliberative rationality. Like any culture, dedicated cultures
employ deductive and inductive reasoning, but serious re-evaluation of cul-
tural norms or values occur rarely, if at all. Moreover, though we can imag-
ine cultures that deliberate about means, but not about ends, true dedicated
cultures have dedicated means also. Dedicated cultures are concerned with
predictability, order and closure, and therefore restrict both the quality and
quantity of appropriate cultural reasoning. Consequently, though reasoning
occurs in dedicated cultures, the depth and breadth of the reasoning if
severely limited.
The difference between deliberative and dedicated cultures also rests
in the deliberative culture's commitment to autonomy and fallibilism.
Through self-regulation, deliberative autonomy guides the reason-giving
process both for the individual and for the society. The members of a delib-
erative culture continually engage in the criticism and correction of cultural
and personal values. The members individually and collectively seek evi-
dence to discredit their values.
This paradoxical feature of the deliberative attitude derives from the
conviction that cultural values are reliable only when they are continually
tested. In a dedicated culture the role of criticism is diminished greatly. No
explicit (and rarely implicit) cultural imperatives exist requiring or permit-
ting members to criticize, revise, and reform society. Indeed, criticism, revi-
sion, and reform may be severely restricted or expressly forbidden.
Id. at 11-12 (footnote omitted).
20. Id. at 7.
21. Id. at 8.
22. Id. at 39. He adds:
At best liberalism can justify multicultural constitutionalism as an accom-
modation or compromise. At worst, liberalism is incompatible with dedicated
cultures because its commitment to the deliberative attitude inclines it
toward justifying dedicated cultures only in deliberative terms. This creates
a tendency to interpret and justify dedicated cultures in terms not shared
by the members of the given culture resulting in distortion of the culture
and condescension towards its members. When tolerance is unlikely, liberal-
ism is inclined towards reforming or eliminating dedicated cultures in its
drive to become the culture of cultures.
Id. at 39-40.
23. As Professor Lipkin aptly points out, deliberative cultures find it difficult to
9
Smith: Sovereignty and the Sacred
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1995
304 MONTANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56
Indigenous cultures, including tribal cultures, are often
predominantly dedicated in their nature. While generalizations
are ever suspect,24 most tribal cultures are based on a paradigm
that differs greatly from the dominant deliberative culture.2
Rather than being based on rationality and autonomy, dedicated
cultures are often based on constancy, closure and community. In
order to see beauty and depth in such a culture, one committed
to the deliberative cultural paradigm must disregard her cultural
paradigm and seek to understand another. This is less of a ratio-
nal exegesis and more of an immersion or participation in the
dedicated culture.26 Such immersion or participation is often
made all the more difficult, however, because many dedicated
cultures are not open to outsiders. Nevertheless, it may be pre-
cisely the shedding27 of one's cultural paradigm for another that
even tolerate dedicated cultures, because their beauty and depth are different in
nature. Indeed, given that the dominant deliberative culture can naturally find beau-
ty and depth in its own kind (cultures that are deliberative), it is less capable of
justifying a sense of respect or relish for differing cultural paradigms.
24. Indian religions and cultures "cannot be discussed as a monolithic system of
beliefs and practices." O'Brien, supra note 8, at n.15.
25. See, e.g., DOUG BOYD, ROLLING THUNDER (1974). ROLLING THUNDER depicts
the largely dedicated nature of the culture of which traditional Indian "medicine
man" is a part. The author describes how he (a scientist) first had to disregard his
deliberative-scientific-sense of nature, to begin to understand the life of a tradi-
tional Indian "medicine man." As the scientist shed his predominant deliberative
paradigm, or at least opened himself up to another more dedicated world view or
culture, he began to see beauty and depth in that culture. Indeed, given that the
culture presents a different cultural paradigm, not just a variation of themes cast by
our dominant deliberative culture, he came to appreciate unanticipated depth and
beauty in that culture.
Boyd seems to have recognized this different paradigm early in his interaction
with Rolling Thunder. He points out that, for Rolling Thunder, "knowing is be-
ing . . . . The meaning of all this is that when Rolling Thunder talks about 'a right
time and place for everything-you have to live it to understand it,' he is talking
about becoming part of the right time and the right place." Id. at 71.
26. Boyd acknowledges that, from his time with Rolling Thunder, he had
"learned that the rational mind is not the source of new insights. The rational mind
can be expanded to accommodate new learning, but it does not undertake learning."
Id. at 111. This for Boyd, then, may be the "beauty and depth" that attends experi-
encing a new cultural paradigm-a paradigm that in some sense may be said to
transcend rational discourse.
27. "Shedding" is undoubtedly too strong of a term, because it is unrealistic to
assume that one can ever completely shed her predominant paradigm, without some
significant conversion-like process (i.e., to shed would be to depart entirely). Such a
conversion-like process is rare, however. It is enough, perhaps, that one struggles to
be free of the shackles of her cultural paradigm for a period long enough to enable
her to gain enhanced understanding of both the nature and substance of another
paradigm. Shedding may, therefore, be appropriate in much the sense that a snake
sheds its skin, only to have it reappear in a slightly different form. The difference is
so slight that the shedding does not transform (or in our metaphor, convert) so much
10
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provides the opportunity to experience ultimately the beauty and
depth that Justice Tobriner speaks of in the Woody case.
There are additional reasons why resistance to applying
Establishment Clause doctrine may be warranted. If the
postmodernists are correct in asserting that there are inherent
limitations to rational discourse,"8 which is at the basis of the
deliberative cultural paradigm, then the pursuit of truth, if a
worthy pursuit at all, might well be directed more to an exami-
nation of dedicated cultural paradigms. At any rate, given the
limits of the deliberative process, nothing justifies giving addi-
tional weight to the dominant deliberative culture. Since the
deliberative culture predominates in much of Western civiliza-
tion, there is at least an implicit societal preference-the prefer-
ence that comes when any culture predominates-for the deliber-
ative culture. As noted previously, because the predominant
culture places pressure on (coerces, if you will) participants in
dedicated subcultures to conform or at least to defer to the pre-
dominant culture, there is little need to invoke legal doctrine like
the Establishment Clause to further inhibit the capacity of the
subculture to develop.
A final related argument may be marshalled in favor of the
proposition that the Establishment Clause doctrine should not be
imposed in Indian Country. Given that the world is a shrinking
place and we will have to deal in a global context with a variety
of dedicated cultures that reject Establishment Clause values, we
would do well to permit tribes to provide us with a laboratory in
which to observe the development of human potential in a dedi-
cated cultural context. This argument that the tribes can provide
us with a fruitful testing ground is little more than a warmed-
over version of the argument for federalism that has been put
forth to permit experimentation at the state level. It is different
only as a matter of degree, in that it permits experimentation at,
as it causes the skin to assume a new hue, a hue that might not be had were it not
for exposure to a new cultural paradigm. There is, of course, beauty and depth in
slight changes, even when such changes are not transformative. Indeed, it may be
well that the changes come more in the form of insights than in the form of trans-
formation, because it is hardly a given that one should shed her culture/religion as a
whole and be transformed or converted to another culture, although if we are genu-
inely committed to expressive choice, the possibility of transformation or conversion
must remain a real possibility. It is enough generally, however, that one's own life
takes on added depth and beauty for having been exposed to another cultural para-
digm. Understanding will inevitably result.
28. See Gedicks, supra note 16, at 96-101. Gedicks makes a powerful argument
to the effect that there are inherent limitations to the rational, adjudicatory endeavor
in the very context of religious liberty.
305
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perhaps, the most fundamental level, the level of culture.
The confirmed separationist, who believes that the Estab-
lishment Clause doctrine is inherently good and that the mix of
religion with the public sector is always bad, will no doubt dis-
agree, asserting that individual liberty will be depleted and that
we will be engaging in experimentation at the expense of the
liberty of individual Native Americans and unwilling taxpayers
who contribute to the funding of the experiment.29 A partial re-
sponse to this objection is simply that free exercise and other
rights provisions do apply in Indian Country, and may be in-
voked by individual Native Americans and others directly ex-
posed to the religious aspects of the tribal culture to protect their
personal choices and to resist the most coercive aspects of that
culture.
IV. CONCLUSION
I commenced this essay with my experience in traveling to
six of the seven tribal colleges in Montana. During those visits, I
was exposed to repeated instances when the religion pervasive in
the tribal cultures was evident in a public context. Prayers were
uttered, songs were sung, and blessings were offered. A sense of
reverence attended those affirmations and exercises of the tribes'
culture. In the course of this essay I have offered a series of
arguments as to why the Establishment Clause doctrine should
not be invoked to inhibit these expressions of tribal culture.
Those reasons dictate that we give broad latitude to and recog-
nize the sovereignty of the tribes, despite what might be char-
acterized as periodic Establishment Clause violations.
At one stop, a tribal college President commended our group
for coming to listen and not speak. Everyone in our group was
edified, I believe, by lessons learned in silence. In many Indian
cultures, there is an emphasis on time and place. Now is the
time for silence, from the standpoint of enforcing the Estab-
lishment Clause doctrine in Indian Country-a time to permit
the sacred and the sovereign to be one.
29. It is interesting to note that establishment or separationist concerns do not
have much impact on the designation of foreign aid. As quasi-sovereigns, tribes may
well be due similar deference on political grounds, as well.
306 [Vol. 56
12
Montana Law Review, Vol. 56 [1995], Iss. 1, Art. 12
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol56/iss1/12
